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Introduction
The precise relationship between the Party Wall etc Act 1996 and
the established common law rules relating to party walls remains
something of a mystery.1 Arena Property Services Ltd v Europa
2000 Ltd provided the Court of Appeal with its first opportunity
to consider this, in the context of the Act’s treatment of ease-
ments. The case is of particular interest as it also addresses some
of the related contradictions in the statute’s compensation
regime.
The case concerned two terraced properties at Nos 96 and 98
Farringdon Road, London EC1. The properties were three storeys
in height and were separated by a party wall. Arena Property
Services Ltd owned a 20-year leasehold interest in No.96. The
freehold interest in No.98 was jointly owned by two individuals,
Macit and Bas. Refurbishment works were undertaken to both
properties between November 2000 and August 2002 and during
the course of these, Europa 2000 Ltd acquired a 99-year lease in
the first and second floors of No.98.
Arena had issued a claim, in the county court, for damages for
nuisance caused by the works at No.98. The present proceedings
relate to a counterclaim in that action by Europa arising out of the
works at No.96.
The Facts
In November 2000, Arena served a party structure notice on
Macit and Bas in respect of the proposed works to No.96, as
required by s.3 of the 1996 Act. This proposed a number of
building operations to the party wall and made reference to the
appropriate paragraphs within s.2(2) of the Act. In particular, in
order to facilitate the construction of an extension, it contained a
1 P. Chynoweth, The Party Wall Casebook (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2003), pp.3–8.
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proposal to remove parts of a soil pipe under paras (f), (g) and
(h).2
The soil pipe served the first and second floor premises at
No.98 but passed across the party wall at first floor level and then
travelled vertically down on the outside wall of No.96. At a point
just above the ground, it then passed back, cutting through the
party wall itself, and was connected to the mains drainage on
No.98’s side of the boundary.
In due course, surveyors were appointed to resolve matters
under the Act3 and, in October 2001, they published their
statutory award.4 This (inter alia) authorised the removal of the
soil pipe to the extent that it affected either No.96 or the party
wall. Arena then removed these portions of the pipe in March
2002.
Unfortunately, these arrangements failed to take Europa’s
interest in No.98 into account. Despite ongoing negotiations to
grant them a 99-year lease of the first and second floors of this
property, Macit and Bas had failed to disclose the existence of the
notice to them. Europa therefore entered into a contract to
purchase the lease in December 2000 (one month after service of
the original party structure notice) and completed their purchase
in May 2001 (10 months before the soil pipe was eventually cut)
without any knowledge of these matters.
The Claim
The first and second floors of No.98 were fully refurbished by
August 2002 but Europa were unable to let them due to the
absence, by this stage, of the soil pipe. They, therefore, brought
the present proceedings against Arena to recover their loss of
income for the relevant period. They sought damages for trespass
or, alternatively, compensation under s.7(2) of the 1996 Act.
Europa argued that they were entitled to use the portion of the
soil pipe on Arena’s side of the boundary by virtue of an easement
which their predecessors in title had acquired by prescription.
They also pointed out that they became an adjoining owner, as
defined by the 1996 Act, from the moment they entered into the
2 These paragraphs collectively authorise a building owner to ‘‘cut into a party wall’’, to
‘‘cut away from a party wall . . . any . . . projection on or over the land of the building owner’’
and to ‘‘cut away or demolish . . . .parts of any wall or building of an adjoining owner
overhanging the land of the building owner . . . .to the extent that [this] is necessary . . . .to
enable a vertical wall to be erected or raised against the wall of the building owner . . . .’’
3 As required by s.10(1).
4 In accordance with s.10(10).
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contract to purchase the lease in December 2000.5 From that
date, they therefore claimed to be entitled to the Act’s protection
in two respects.
First, any right to remove the soil pipe, under paras (f), (g) or (h)
of s.2(2), was conditional upon an express obligation to make
good any resulting damage to Europa’s property under s.2(5).6
They argued that this included an obligation to re-route the soil
pipe and, as this had not been done, that Arena had no right to
undertake the work. The act of removal, in March 2002, was
therefore unlawful and Europa sought damages for trespass on
this basis.7
Secondly, they argued that, as an adjoining owner, they were
entitled to compensation under s.7(2) for the losses which they
had incurred. That section provided adjoining owners with a right
to compensation for ‘‘any loss or damage’’ which they suffered
‘‘by reason of any work executed in pursuance of [the] Act’’.8
Europa’s losses arose from the removal of the soil pipe which had
purportedly been undertaken in pursuance of the Act. They
therefore sought compensation for them, under this section, as an
alternative to their claim for damages.
First Instance Decision and Appeal
The trial judge found that Europa had failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to demonstrate the acquisition of a prescriptive ease-
ment. As both of their arguments (above) rested on the prior
existence of an easement, he dismissed their claim on that basis.
However, although not directly relevant to his decision, his
observations on Europa’s two arguments are of more general
interest in understanding some of the contradictions in the Act.
He did not accept that Europa had any claim for damages, as he
considered that there was no obligation, under the Act, to
re-route the soil pipe. He found that the obligation in s.2(5) was
5 Under s.20, the definition of ‘‘owner’’ includes ‘‘a purchaser of an interest in land under a
contract for purchase or under an agreement for a lease, otherwise than under an agreement
for a tenancy from year to year or for a lesser term’’.
6 s.2(5): ‘‘Any right falling within subsection 2(f), (g) or (h) is exercisable subject to making
good all damage occasioned by the work to the adjoining premises or to their internal
furnishings and decorations.’’
7 Presumably on the assumption that the soil pipe remained their property, even though
placed on land owned by Arena. Although apparently not pleaded, the claim could also have
been pursued in nuisance on the basis of the interference with the easement.
8 s.7(2): ‘‘The building owner shall compensate any adjoining owner and any adjoining
occupier for any loss or damage which may result to any of them by reason of any work
executed in pursuance of this Act.’’
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confined to the making good of consequential damage and did not
extend to an obligation to re-route.
He found that the claim for compensation was equally flawed
as, at the time the soil pipe was cut, the easement would have
already ceased to exist. He considered that the Act provided its
own code which entirely superseded the common law. The
easement to use the soil pipe was thus legitimately extinguished
by the surveyors’ award and the pipe’s subsequent removal was
then a case of damnum sine injuria which could, by definition,
provide no entitlement to compensation.
Europa appealed against the decision but this too was dis-
missed. The Court of Appeal held that the judge was fully
entitled to conclude that they had failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to demonstrate the existence of an easement for the soil
pipe. Although Europa had therefore fallen at the first hurdle,
Lord Phillips M.R. noted that their appeal ‘‘might have raised
some interesting points under the Party Wall etc Act 1996’’ and
some of these points were explored in the Court of Appeal.
Requirement to Make Good Under Section 2(5)
Unfortunately, the Court expressed no opinion on the trial judge’s
view that the obligation to make good, in s.2(5) of the Act, did not
also include an obligation to re-route a soil pipe which was
subject to an easement. The judge’s findings on this point were at
variance with standard surveying practice,9 and with some of the
published professional guidance in this area.10 Surveyors’ awards
invariably include provision for the proper functioning of bound-
ary facilities where these are interfered with as an inevitable
consequence of works authorised by the Act.11
The judge’s view also conflicts with the practice at common
law whereby the interference with the fabric of an easement was
permitted providing the substance of the easement was preserved
by alternative means.12 In these circumstances, it is disappoint-
ing that the Court of Appeal apparently saw s.2(5) as peripheral to
the more central question of the Act’s machinery for awarding
monetary compensation.
9 Both under the 1996 Act and under the earlier London Building Acts, which the 1996 Act
largely replicates.
10 See, for example, Pyramus & Thisbe Club, ‘‘The Party Wall Act Explained’’ in The Green
Book (Parrott House Press, 1996), pp.25 and 26.
11 For example, where overhanging gutters are cut off, provision would invariably be made
for alternative drainage arrangements.
12 Bond v Nottingham Corp [1940] Ch. 429; Brace v South East Regional Housing
Association Ltd [1984] 1 E.G.L.R. 144.
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Compensation Under Section 7(2)
The Court’s consideration of these issues focused instead on the
role of s.7(2). This section actually appears to have been included
in the 1996 Act in error, or at least without sufficient thought as
to its effect. It substantially re-enacts s.50(2)(d) of the London
Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 Act which formed part of a
coherent compensation and making good regime within that
legislation.
In the 1939 Act, it related only to loss or damage caused by
underpinning works13 to an adjoining owner’s building within the
Act’s adjacent excavation provisions.14 More modest compensa-
tion and making good arrangements (including those referred to
above and now contained in s.2(5)) applied where less intrusive
works were undertaken under the Act.15
The extension of the draconian s.50(2)(d) provisions to all
works carried out under the Act, without the simultaneous repeal
of these other arrangements, creates a contradiction which still
has to be resolved by the courts. It is, for example, unclear
whether the new provisions are intended to entirely replace these
other arrangements, or to function alongside them in some
way.
The Court of Appeal did not attempt to resolve this contra-
diction in the present case but did comment on the underlying
purpose of compensation under the Act. In particular, it con-
firmed the often misunderstood distinction between statutory
compensation for damage caused by lawful works and common
law damages in tort where the works are unlawful.16 Arden L.J.
described this distinction in her judgment, and also provided
some guidance on how compensation might be assessed:
‘‘I also accept [Europa’s] submission that a right to compensation
arose under section 7(2) of the 1996 Act. Ex hypothesi, that provision
confers a right to compensation even though work is lawfully done
in accordance with the 1996 Act. If that were not so, a claim would
lie in common law.
13 Underpinning or other works to strengthen or safeguard the foundations of the adjacent
building.
14 These provided a building owner with a right (and in some situations, an obligation) to
carry out underpinning work to an adjoining owner’s building when he undertakes deep
excavations on his own land within certain distances of an adjacent building. Almost
identical provisions now appear in s.6 of the 1996 Act.
15 London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939, ss.45(1)(c), 46(1)(e)–(i) and 56(1)(e)(ii); 1996
Act, ss.1(7), 2(3)–(7) and 11(6).
16 Discussed in P. Chynoweth, ‘‘Unnecessary inconvenience and compensation within the
party wall legislation’’ in Structural Survey (2000), Vol.18, No.2, pp.99–104.
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Accordingly, in my judgment, if there was an easement . . . the
right order [for the trial judge] to have made was that an inquiry
should be directed as to the appropriate amount of compensation.
The assessment of that compensation would have to take into
account that Europa merely had a leasehold interest in part of 98
Farrington Road, and that, if it be the fact, it had a right as against
the freeholders of 98 Farrington Road to require them to cause the
soil vent pipe to be constructed on their side of the party wall to the
main sewer.’’
Section 7(2) and Easements
The possibility of a causal relationship between the interference
with an easement and the availability of compensation, referred
to in the second paragraph of this extract, is of particular sig-
nificance.
The trial judge had found that appointed surveyors were able to
extinguish easements by their awards. The subsequent works
could not, therefore, be said to be interfering with an easement
which, by then, would already have ceased to exist. As the works
were, therefore, entirely lawful he did not consider that the
question of compensation could arise.
The Court of Appeal took a different view. It had already noted
that compensation under s.7(2) was ‘‘ex hypothesi‘‘ only available
where work was lawfully undertaken under the Act and therefore
rejected the notion that compensation could not be available in
the current circumstances.
However, if an easement was indeed extinguished from the
moment that the surveyors published their award, this might
produce results which went far beyond those contemplated by the
Act. In particular, once extinguished, the adjoining owner’s rights
in the easement were lost forever, even if the authorised work
was never undertaken, and even as against a third party.
The Court of Appeal therefore concluded that surveyors’
awards were not themselves capable of extinguishing easements.
They simply authorised works to the subject-matter of an ease-
ment. The easement remained effective until the moment that
the works were undertaken. At that moment, the easement was
extinguished and compensation became payable, under s.7(2), for
the resulting losses inflicted on the adjoining owner. The Court’s
reasoning was explained by Arden L.J. in the following terms:
‘‘ . . . [Europa] . . . submits that the award did not extinguish the
easement. If it had so extinguished the easement, Europa could not
even have sued a third party who blocked the pipe, even if Arena
decided not to carry out any work on the party wall after all.
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Moreover, the award itself stated that nothing in it was to affect any
easement. Contrary to the judge’s judgment, section 7(2) clearly
confers a right to compensation for work lawfully done . . . 
. . . In my judgment [Europa are] correct in [their] submission that
the award made by the surveyors pursuant to the dispute which had
arisen following service of Arena’s party structure notice did not of
itself extinguish the easement. The award merely authorised Arena
to carry out the work. The easement was not extinguished until
Arena blocked the pipe so that no use could be made of it by any
adjoining owner of 98 Farringdon Road. In my judgment, the judge
was in error on this point.’’
Extinguishment of Easements
It is implicit in Arden L.J.’s reasoning that the Act, if not a
surveyor’s award, is nevertheless capable of authorising the
extinguishment of easements. In one sense, this is logical as some
of the rights given to building owners within s.2(2) (including, as
in this case, the right to cut off projections) are clearly incompat-
ible with the continued existence of easements.
However, it is difficult to reconcile this interpretation with s.9
which expressly provides that nothing in the Act ‘‘shall authorise
any interference with . . . easements in or relating to a party
wall’’.17 Arden L.J. noted that there was a ‘‘difficult and important
question’’ about the relationship between s.9 and the right to
undertake work under the Act but, as the matter had not been
raised at the trial, the Court of Appeal declined to explore it
further.
Despite this, the Court did consider whether s.9 referred to all
forms of easement or simply to those, such as easements of
support, which might be regarded as the incidents of the party
wall itself. Europa had suggested that any easement in respect of
the soil pipe, could not be said to ‘‘relate’’ to the party wall in this
way, and that it must therefore fall outside s.9. Arden L.J.
regarded this as an artificial distinction. An easement in respect
of the soil pipe could not ‘‘be split into a number of separate
easements’’ and was therefore included within the meaning of
s.9.
This does expose an inconsistency in the totality of the court’s
observations on the 1996 Act. If any easement to use the soil pipe
fell within s.9 then the surveyors had no authority to authorise
17 s.9: ‘‘Nothing in this Act shall: (a) authorise any interference with an easement of light
or other easements in or relating to a party wall; or (b) prejudicially affect any right of any
person to preserve or restore any right or other thing in or connected with a party wall in case
of the party wall being pulled down or rebuilt.’’
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works which would interfere with it. Any such works would
therefore be unlawful. This would lead to liability in damages and
not, as had been suggested by Arden L.J., to an entitlement to
compensation under s.7(2).
Conclusions
There was nothing remarkable about the actual decision in this
case. Europa sought either damages or compensation for losses
caused by an interference with an easement. Their claim failed,
both at first instance and on appeal, because they had failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of the
easement.
The case is of more interest for the light it sheds on the
difficulties in interpreting some of the apparently contradictory
provisions within the 1996 Act. In this context, the Court of
Appeal made a number of observations about the way the Act
would have operated if Europa had succeeded in demonstrating
the existence of an easement for their soil pipe.
It concluded that the Act could legitimately authorise a perma-
nent interference with the easement. The surveyors’ award could
therefore validly authorise the removal of the pipe and, at the
moment of removal, the easement would be extinguished. The
work would be entirely lawful and Europa’s claim for damages
must therefore fail. However, compensation would be properly
payable to them under s.7(2) as their losses would have arisen
from ‘‘work executed in pursuance’’ of the Act.
If correct, this analysis represents a radical departure from the
practice under the London Building Acts. Although the full scope
of compensation under s.7(2) has yet to be established, it seems
unlikely that Parliament intended it to be used to buy out the
property rights of adjoining owners. Indeed, the courts have
consistently rejected the notion that the London Building Acts
were capable of authorising the permanent expropriation of
adjoining owners’ property rights, including the permanent inter-
ference with an easement.18 It is possible that this analysis might
also have been more difficult to sustain if the Court of Appeal had
18 See, for example: Titterton v Conyers (1813) 5 Taunt. 465; Wells v Oddy (1836) 1 M. &
W. 452; Crofts v Haldane (1867) L.R. 2 Q.B. 194; Re Metropolitan Building Act Ex p. McBride
(1876) 4 Ch. D 200; Barry v Minturn [1913] A.C. 585; Burlington Property Co Ltd v Odeon
Theatres Ltd [1939] 1 K.B. 633; Gyle-Thompson v Wall Street (Properties) Ltd [1974] 1 All E.R.
295.
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first confronted the ‘‘difficult and important question’’ about the
effect of s.9 referred to in Arden L.J.’s judgment.
Whatever the eventual scope of s.7(2), it is submitted that the
functioning of the 1996 Act is much closer to that of the London
Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 than the Court of Appeal
appears to suggest. The stated purpose of the 1996 Act was ‘‘to
extend the tried and tested provisions of the London Building
Acts to England and Wales’’19 and, with one or two notable
exceptions, the wording of the two Acts is identical.
Like the London Building Acts, the 1996 Act clearly authorises
the temporary interference with easements during construction
operations.20 However, based on the widespread understanding of
equivalent provisions in these earlier Acts,21 s.9 would seem to
exclude the possibility of any works which might permanently
deprive an adjoining owner of his easement.
On this basis, Arena would have had no right to remove the soil
pipe without simultaneously preserving the substance of the
easement. In practice, this would have required the pipe to be
re-routed, as was previously the practice at common law as well
as under the London Building Acts. Indeed, as has already been
noted, this is now standard practice under s.2(5) of the 1996 Act.
In these circumstances, the dubious possibility of buying out an
easement with compensation under s.7(2) should never need to
arise.
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Introduction
Although enshrined in the pleader’s mantra—‘‘Negligence, Nui-
sance, Rylands v Fletcher’’—the imposition of tortious liability
19 Hansard, HL, Vol.568, col.1535 (January 31, 1996).
20 Discussed in S. Bickford-Smith and C. Sydenham, Party Walls: The New Law (Jordans,
1997), p.104.
21 London Building Act 1894, s.101; London Building Act 1930, s.127; London Building Acts
(Amendment) Act 1939, s.54.
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